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STATEMENT OF THIS COURTS JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal by Rule 4A 
and Rule 5 of the Utah Court of Appeal Rules, and 78-2a-3 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, 1988 Supplement. Further, this Court 
was given jurisdiction by the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Third District Court, for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, in that the District Court, Judge 
L. Russon, dismissed the appellant's Writ of Habeas Corpus on 
December 21, 1988. 
SUMMARY OF THE ISSUES 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT 
COULD NOT SEEK RELIEF BY HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING AN EVlDENTARY 
HEARING 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S 
ANDERS ISSUE 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT 
APPELLANT'S TRIAL TO SUBSTAIN A CONVICTION 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 76-1-402 AND 
76-1-403 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 22, 1984, at or about 12:30 a.m. midnight a bur-
glary was dicovered at the Omega Drive In, located at 3490 
South State Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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At 2; 10 a.m. on May 22, 1984, the West Valley Police 
Department was dispatched to the Old Hotel Saloon because of a 
reported caller stating that a man had entered a City Cab with 
a gun. The City Cab was subsequently stopped and the appellant 
was arrested for "Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restriced 
Person. 
On the 25th of May, 1984, an information was subscribed 
and sworn, and preliminary hearing was set for June 5, 19 84. 
The prosecuting agency in this case was the Salt Lake County 
Attorneys Office, case no. CRS-WV-1856F. 
On May 25, 1984, the prosecuting attorney, John Soltis, 
called the prosecuting attorney in case no. CRS-WV-1856F to 
verify that there were charges being filed against the appellant, 
Preliminary Hearing Transcripts of CR84-877, (further referred 
to as PHT), at page 32 and 33. At this time Mr. Soltis, informed 
the West Valley Police Department that he was filing, Burglary, 
Theft and Habitual Criminal charges against the appellant. 
Further, on May 25, 1984, prosecuting attorney Soltis, informed 
Officer Bullock that he was filing the habitual criminal against 
the appellant as soon as Officer Bullock obtained the necessary 
convictions. (PHT at 29) 
On June 5, 1984, appellant was offered a plea bargain in 
case no. CRS-WV-1856F, that if the appellant pled to a "Possession 
charge that the prosecution would reduce the charge to a, Class 
A Misdemenor. At this time the appellant entered his plea of 
guilty to the reduced charge in case no. CRS-WV-1856F, the trial 
Court Judge asked the prosecuting attorney, Vuyk, was the 
habitual criminal going to be filed against the appellant. Mr. 
Vuyk, told the court that this was the end of the prosecution 
for this weapon. Thus, the appellant was sentenced to one year 
in the Utah State Prison. 
On June 11, 1984, the appellant was charged with Count I, 
Burglary, a Third Degree Felony; Count II, Theft, a Second Degree 
Felony, and; Count III, Habitual Criminal, a First Degree Felony. 
In this information the same date was alleged as in case no. 
CRS-WV-1856F, further the same facts were alleged in case no. 
CR-84-877. Preliminary hearing was set for July 10, 1984. At 
preliminary hearing the appellant filed his motion to dismiss 
under Utah Code Ann. 76-1-402 and 76-1-403, this motion was 
denied by Judge Gibson, and trial was set for September 14, 1984. 
On September 14, 1984, the appellant was tried by a bench 
trial in Judge Russon!s Court. The trial Court denied the 
appellants motion to dismiss. The appellant was found guilty of 
all counts, andsentencing was set for October 11, 1984. 
Appellant was sentenced to 0-5 years for the Burglary, Count I; 
1-15 years for Count II, Theft, and; 5 to life for Count III, 
Habitual Criminal. 
The appellant's attorney of record was Frances M. Palacios, 
LDA, court appointed. Appellant was advised by his trial court 
counsel not to appeal his conviction because of the fact that 
he could set bad case law. Thus, the appellant did not perfect 
a direct appeal of his confictions in case no. CR-84-877. 
On September 1, 1988, the appellant filed with the trial 
court in this case an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
This was dismissed by Judge Russon, on December 21, 1988. 
ARGUMENTS 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS 
RULING THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT 
SEEK RELIEF BY HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF 
The lower court erred in its ruling that appellant could 
not bring his claims in the manner in which he has, "Habeas 
Corpus". 
The appellant has raised substantial constitutional rights 
violations, moreover the appellant has shown by the record in 
this action that there was a complete disregard for the laws and 
statues of the State of Utah and the United States. 
In the case of BUNDY vs. DELAND, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988), 
this court stated: 
"Habeas Corpus proceedings may be used to 
attack a judgement or conviction in the 
event of an obvious injustice or a 
substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional right in the trial of a matter;" 
Id. at 763 P.2d at 804. 
What the court is stating in this case is that a habeas 
corpus is the correct relief available to the appellant, in fact 
it is the only relief available to the appellant. 
The Supreme Court of Utah reached the same ruling in 
BOGGIS vs.MORRIS, 653 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981), this court stated: 
"The scope of review by the common-law 
writ of certiorari was very broad, incampassing 
not just questions of jurisdiction but also 
a review of the evidence and the regularity 
of the proceedings to determine whether the 
'proceedings were had in accordance with law1, 
and to correct 'errors in law affecting the 
substantial rights of the parties.!"(citations 
ommitted) 
Id. at 635 P.2d at 42. 
The courts of this state have well set that an appellant 
may seek review of constitutional violations through the writ 
of habeas corpus as the court in the BUNDY case stated: 
"or when the requirements of law have 
been so disregarded that the party is 
substantially and effectively denied due 
process of law, or where sone such 
fact is shown that it would be 
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction." 
Id. at 763 P.2d at 804 quoting from BROWN vs. TURNER, 21 Utah 2d 
96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968). 
Thus, the appellants only relief is to seek Habeas Corpus 
relief in this court. 
II-
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
NOT HOLDING AN EVIDENTARY HEARING 
The appellant has raised an ineffective assistance claim 
against his trial court counsel at the trial court level and on 
the appellant being instructed not to file a direct appeal of 
his convictions. In the case of SUMMER vs. COOK, 759 P.2d 341 
this court stated: 
"...(o)ne instance of an obious injustice 
would be the failure of an attorney to take 
an appeal when there is a substantial claim 
of a deprivation of a constitutional right 
which goes to the basic fairness of the trial. 
A petition for writ of habeas corpus is 
clearly appropriate in such circumstances and 
may be properly utilized to remedy a failure 
to perfect am appeal occasioned by counsel." 
Id. at 759 P.2d 344, quoting from CHESS vs. SMITH, 617 P.2d 
341 at 343-344 (Utah 1980). 
Further, the appellant did wish to appeal his convictions, 
but do to the advise of counsel the appellant did not make a 
direct appeal. Appellant had no other attorney or did he have 
the knowledge of the law and all of his rights that he was 
giving up by not filing a direct appeal. In the case of SUMMER 
vs.-COOK, supra: 
"Given plaintiff's stated reasons for not taking 
a direct appeal and the nature of his claims, 
meaningful habeas corpus review is appropriate 
in this case to assure fundamental fairness. 
Therefore, we find error in the dismissal of 
plaintiff's petition without an evidentiary 
hearing on the merits of his claims." 
Id. at 759 P.2d at 344 (Utah 1988). 
Further, see ANDERS vs. CALIFORNIA, 87 S.Ct. 1396. The 
appellant's counsel told the appellant that his claims had merit 
but that she thought that the courts would not rule in his favor, 
further that if the appeal was lost that "bad case law would be 
set." 
Thus, the appellant should have been granted an evidentiary 
hearing on his claims. 
Ill 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT 
RULING ON THE APPELLANT'S ANDERS ISSUE 
In the case of ANDERS vs. CALIFORNIA, 87 S.Ct. 1396, the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
"The constitutional requirement of substantial 
equality and fair process can only be attained 
where counsel acts in the role of an active 
advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed 
to that of amicus curiae...His role as 
advocate requires that he support his clients 
appeal to the best of his ability." 
Id. at 87 S.Ct. at 1400. 
Do to the appellant's counsel advise and her not filing a 
notice of direct appeal the appellant was denied his right to 
a direct appeal. 
7 
IV. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT APPELLANT'S TRIAL TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
There was insufficient evidence to convict the appellant 
at his trial, in that the only evidence that was presented was 
the fact that the appellant had plead guilty to the possession 
of the gun that was stolen from the Omega Drive In on May 22, 
1984. The prosecutor in the appellant's trial introduced the 
appellant's guilty plea in Circuit Court to prove Prima Facia 
proof that the appellant had committed the burglary and the 
theft in this case. This should have been inadmissible as 
the sole evidence to support the appellant's conviction. In the 
case of STATE vs. TURNER, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), this 
court ruled as follows: 
"In this case, Turner's not guilty plea and 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cast the burden of proof directly 
upon the prosecution." 
Id. at 736 P.2d 1044. Also see STATE vs. SORENSON, 758 P.2d 
466 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the appellant's trial there was no evidence to the fact 
that the appellant had committed a burglary and/or theft, that 
prosecution relied on the appellant's guilty plea to a possess-
ion charge that he had peld guilty to. 
Further, the appellant was not found to be in possession 
of any other property that was taken from teh Omega Drive In. 
This court stated in the TURNER case: 
"The prejudicial effect of the presumtions 
created by the jury instructions is 
especially clear in light of the slim evidentiary 
basis for Turner's convictions. The fact ~~ 
of mere possession was the only direct 
evidence against Turner, (emphasis added) 
IV. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
AT APPELLANT'S TRIAL TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
There was insufficient evidence to convict the appellant 
at his trial, in that the only evidence that was presented was 
the fact that the appellant had plead guilty to the possession 
of the gun that was stolen from the Omega Drive In on May 22, 
1984. The prosecutor in the appellant1s trial introduced the 
appellant's guilty plea in Circuit Court to prove Prima Facia 
proof that the appellant had committed the burglary and the 
theft in this case. This should have been inadmissible as 
the sole evidence to support the appellant's conviction. In the 
case of STATE vs. TURNER, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), this 
court ruled as follows: 
"In this case, Turner's not guilty plea and 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cast the burden of proof directly 
upon the prosecution." 
Id. at 736 P.2d 1044. Also see STATE vs. SORENSON, 758 P.2d 
466 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the appellant's trial there was no evidence to the fact 
that the appellant had committed a burglary and/or theft, that 
prosecution relied on the appellant's guilty plea to a possess-
ion charge that he had peld guilty to. 
Further, the appellant was not found to be in possession 
of any other property that was taken from teh Omega Drive In. 
This court stated in the TURNER case: 
"The prejudicial effect of the presumtions 
created by the jury instructions is 
especially clear in light of the slim evidentiary 
basis for Turner's convictions. The fact 
of mere possession was the only direct 
evidence against Turner, (emphasis added) 
Id. at 736 P.2d at 1046, 
It should be noted that this is also ineffective assis-
tance of counsel on the part of the trial counsel, in that 
trial court counsel should have requested a directed verdict 
when the prosecution rested. Further, see STATE vs. LESLEY, 
672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983) and SANDSTROM vs. MONTANA, 442 U.S. 
510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). 
Thus, the burden was shifted to the appellant to prove 
that he did not commit the burglary and theft in this case, 
this clearly violates the appellantTs constitutional rights 
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the appellant had committed the burglary in the 
instant case, this was not supported by the evidence that was 
adduced at trial. In the case of STATE vs. JAMISON, 767 P. 2d 
134 (Utah App. 1989) this court stated: 
"In reviewing a claim of insufficient 
evidence, this Court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict 
and will interfere only when the evidence 
is so lacking and insubstantial that a reason-
able person could not possibly have reached 
a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Quoting TANNER, 675 P.2d at 550. 
Wherefore, this Court should find that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support the appellantTs conviction for 
Count I, Burglary. 
It should be noted that the District Court ruled on the 
issue of sufficiency of the evidence in it ruling denying the 
appellant1s writ of habeas corpus. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 
TO UTAH CODE ANN. 76-1-402 AND 76-1-403 
The District Court erred in its ruling nFindings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Lawn, in that the Court states in its ruling: 
nThe burglary occurred and was completed by 
the breaking and entering without authorization 
onto the premises of the victim, and remaining 
on the premises with the intent to commit a 
theft. The crime of theft was committed and completed 
when the defendant obtained and exercised unauthor-
ized control over the property of the victim, 
with the pupose to deprive the owner of it. The 
crime of possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person was committed some 
one and one-half hours later, after 
petitioner had apparently spent time at a bar, 
entered into a taxi cab to travel 
elsewhere, and was stopped by the police 
enroute, at which time he was found to be 
in possession of a weapon.M 
Id. at page -6-. 
Its the postion of the appellant that when he came into 
possession of the weapon for the purpose of theft, that he at 
the same instance became in possession as a restricted person. 
Possess is definded in 76-1-601 Utah Code Ann., which provides: 
tTUnless other wise provided or a different 
meaning plainly is required, the following 
terms shall be applicable to this code, in 
its entirety, and shall have the meanings 
designed in this section... 
(7) TPossessT means to have 
physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(emphasis added) 
Thus, as the court stated the appellant possessed the 
weapon for the purposes of theft upon his being in possession 
of it, it would follow that this same possession would constitute 
possession by a restricted person. It should Further be noted at 
this point that the appellant sould not be sentenced to "possession 
6. 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person", this crime 
carries a mandatory felony, under Utah Code Ann. 76-10-503(1). 
The prosecution choose to charge the appellant with the 
crime of possession and entered into a plea bargain with the 
appellant in this case, thus barring a second conviction under 
76-1-402 Utah Code Ann. 
The court in STATE vs.BAIR, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 19 83), 
faced a closely related question of possession: 
"because 'retaining* the stolen 
property of differnt individuals is 
but a single act and must be prosecuted as 
only one offense if the evidence shows, 
as it clearly does here, that the retention 
or possession of such stolen property 
was simultaneous.M(emphasis added) 
Id. at 671 P.2d at 208. 
The District Court has seperated the two possessions, by 
stating that the theft was completed at the instance the 
appellant came into possession ofthe gun belonging to another, 
and the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon was completed 
upon the appellants arrest. This is clearly an erronous ruling 
and finding of facts. The appellant could not be in possession 
of the same weapon twice while he never gave up the possession. 
Using the lower courts ruling the appellant could than not be 
guilty of the theft, or not guilty of the possession of a 
dangerous weapon. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated: 
"The single criminal episode statute is 
strictly procedural in nature. It requires 
that when a defendant is brought before a court, 
all offenses arising from a single incident 
which are triable before that court be 
charged at the same time. If seperate 
charges can be joined, they should 
7. 
be. But if jointer is not 
permissible, the state is not 
required to choose to prosecute only 
some of the offenses committed 
by a defendant. 
Id. at 598 P.2d at 345, STATE vs. SOSA. 
The appellant was in possession of the weapon and he pled 
to this possession on June 5, 1984, to an information that 
alleges May 22, 1984, case no. CRS-WV-1856F, the information in 
the same instant case before the bar alleges the same date and 
the same weapon. In the case of UNITED STATES vs. BROCE, 781 
F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1986) this court addressed the issue of 
identical informations and the fact that a guilty plea can not 
bar the defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim. 
Utah Criminal Code 76-1-402, Seperate offenses arising out 
of single criminal episode - Included offenses states in part: 
"(2) Whenever conduct mayestablish 
seperate offenses under 
a single criminal episode, unless 
the court otherwise orders to 
promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subjected to seperate 
trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction 
of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting 
attorney at the time the defendant 
is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment, (emphasis added) 
In the case at bar all the requirements are clearly met. 
The Salt Lake County Prosecutors prosecuted both of the 
informations, further, Mr. Soltis, expressly stated to the court 
at preliminary hearing that he knew of the other charge on May 
25, 1984, see 76-1-402 (2) (b). Both informations could been 
tried in the same court, as they are both indictable charges. 
Appellant concedes that he could have been tried for all of 
these offenses in one court, one trial, but that 76-1-402 and 
76-1-403 of the Utah Code Ann. are both violated in the instant 
case. 76-1-403 of the Utah Code Ann., states in part: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted 
for one or more offenses arising 
out of a single criminal episode, 
a subsequent prosecution for the same 
or a different offenses arising out 
of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an 
offenses that was or should have been 
tried under section 76-1-402 (2) 
in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(ii) Resulted in conviction; or (emphasis added) 
In the instant case at bar the appellant was convicted by 
his guilty plea to case no. CRS-WV-1856F, thus barring a sub-
sequent prosecution for crimes that arose out of the same 
criminal episode. The state has argued that the possession for 
the purposes of theft was completed when the appellant came 
into possession of the gun, and they argue that appellant did 
not come into possession of the same gun for the purposes of 
being in possession of a dangerous weapon until he was arrested. 
This argument is totally without merit. The being in possession 
for the purposes of theft and being in possession of a dangerous 
weapon were simultaneous and not at different times. If they 
were at different times the state would have to prove such as 
in the case of STATE vs. BAIR, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983) the 
court stated: 
"In light of the aforestated facts, we 
conclude that the offenses allegedly committed 
by defendant for which he was prosecuted 
in the first and second (present) prosecutions 
were closely related in time and pursuant 
to a single criminal objective. Accordingly, 
we hold that the present prosecution is 
precluded by the single criminal episode 
statute, supra," 
Id. at 671 P.2d at 208. 
As the court decided in BIAR case, the prosecution had 
to prove different possessions at different times and not just 
the statement that the appellant did come into possession at 
different times. This would be a violation of the appellant's 
due process rights, in that the appellant would have to prove 
he came into possession at the same time. Its not the appellantTs 
obligation to prove any facts at trial, but it is the obligation 
of the prosecution to prove the facts they have alleged are 
true. This put the appellant in the postion of prosecuting 
himself, in direct violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Appellant would further contend that his due process 
rights have been violated and that this court should take 
action, see CARTER vs. MCCARTHY, 806 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1986): 
"Our circuit has held that a collateral 
attack based on a violation of a state 
rule of criminal procedure will succeed, 
and a due process violation will be 
found, when the petitioner shows that 
he was prejudiced or that his rights 
were affectedthereby. WAYNE vs. KAINES, 
690 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1983)." 
Id. at 1376 n.2. 
Thus, the lower Court erred in denying the appellant's motion to 
dismiss pursuant to the Utah singly criminal episode statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
That due to the facts and arguments and exhibits presented 
to this Court by the appellant this Court should vacate the lower 
Court's order dismissing/denying the appellant's application for 
the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Furthermore/ the Court 
should vacate the appellant's judgments of conviction in case number 
CR-84-877 due to the prosecutions misconduct and abuse of his office. 
Dated this 29th day of August, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Michael R. Dulin (Evans) 
P.O. Box 607, #26022 
Carson City, Nevada 89702 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Michael R. Dulin (Evans), do hereby certify that on the 29th 
day of August, 1989, that I placed in the United States mail a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing, APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF, 
addressed as follows: 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF UTAH 
236 STATE CAPITOL BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
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